Analysis of IoT-Based Load Altering Attacks Against Power Grids Using
  the Theory of Second-Order Dynamical Systems by Lakshminarayana, Subhash et al.
1Analysis of IoT-Based Load Altering Attacks
Against Power Grids Using the Theory of
Second-Order Dynamical Systems
Subhash Lakshminarayana Senior Member, IEEE, Sondipon Adhikari, and Carsten Maple
Abstract—Recent research has shown that large-scale Internet
of Things (IoT)-based load altering attacks can have a serious
impact on power grid operations such as causing unsafe fre-
quency excursions and destabilizing the grid’s control loops. In
this work, we present an analytical framework to investigate
the impact of IoT-based static/dynamic load altering attacks
(S/DLAAs) on the power grid’s dynamic response. Existing work
on this topic has mainly relied on numerical simulations and, to
date, there is no analytical framework to identify the victim nodes
from which that attacker can launch the most impactful attacks.
To address these shortcomings, we use results from second-
order dynamical systems to analyze the power grid frequency
control loop under S/DLAAs. We use parametric sensitivity of the
system’s eigensolutions to identify victim nodes that correspond
to the least-effort destabilizing DLAAs. Further, to analyze the
SLAAs, we present closed-form expression for the system’s
frequency response in terms of the attacker’s inputs, helping
us characterize the minimum load change required to cause
unsafe frequency excursions. Using these results, we formulate
the defense against S/DLAAs as a linear programming problem
in which we determine the minimum amount of load that needs
to be secured at the victim nodes to ensure system safety/stability.
Extensive simulations conducted using benchmark IEEE-bus
systems validate the accuracy and efficacy of our approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
The electric grid is undergoing a fundamental transforma-
tion from a centralized, producer-controlled network to one
that integrates distributed players in its operations. Programs
such as demand response seek the active involvement of end-
users in reducing the grid’s peak demand. Moreover, there is
also a growing integration of Internet-of-Things (IoT) enabled
devices at the consumer side, such as Wi-Fi-enabled air
conditioners and residential battery energy storage systems [1],
which can be remotely controlled using personal computers or
mobile phones such as smartphones, PC/tablets. These intel-
ligent devices provide convenience, efficiency and monitoring
capabilities, enabling consumers to better manage their usage.
However, IoT-enabled consumer appliances are often poorly
engineered from a security point of view [2], [3]. As such, they
may become convenient entry points for malicious parties to
gain access to the system and disrupt important grid operations
by abruptly changing the demand. Cyber attacks targeting
bulk power grid operations and state estimation problems have
received significant attention [4], [5], [6], [7]. In contrast,
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research on cyber attacks that target the end-user consumer
devices is relatively new. Although internet-based load altering
attacks were first introduced in [8], which identified various
load devices that are vulnerable to such attacks and proposed
defense strategies, it was only recently that large-scale load
altering attacks were studied considering a IoT-Botnet type
attack [9], [10], [11]. These works showed sudden and abrupt
manipulation of the power grid demand due to such attacks can
increase the grid’s operational cost, and in some cases, cause
unsafe frequency excursions. While power grid protection
mechanisms such as under frequency load shedding (UFLS)
can prevent large-scale blackouts, nevertheless, load-altering
attacks remain capable of causing a partition in bulk power
systems and/or a controlled load shedding event [12]. The
aforementioned works are representatives of the so-called
static load altering attacks (SLAAs), which involves a one-
time manipulation of the demand.
More severe attacks are the so-called dynamic load altering
attacks (DLAAs), in which the attacker changes the amount of
compromised load over time to follow a certain trajectory [13],
[14]. In contrast to SLAAs, DLAAs require the attacker to
monitor certain power grid signals (e.g., frequency or voltage)
and alter the load in response to the fluctuations of the signal.
Thus, DLAAs require enhanced capabilities on the part of
the attacker. However, DLAAs can have a much more severe
impact on grid operations than SLAAs, such as destabilizing
the power grid control loops [13], leading to generator trips
and cascading failures.
A major shortcoming of existing work on load altering
attacks is that they either adopt a simulation-based approach
(e.g., [11] to assess the impact of SLAAs) or employ methods
such as root locus analysis (e.g., [13] to assess the impact of
DLAAs). However, these approaches can be computationally
expensive as they require exhaustive simulations or eigenvalue
computations under all possible combinations of nodes that
could be targeted by the attacker (in a coordinated multi-point
attack). They do not provide any physical insights into the
system under DLAAs and SLAAs. Moreover, to date, there
is no analytical method to identify the nodes that are most
vulnerable to DLAAs and SLAAs. Amini et. al. [13] also
propose a defense against DLAAs based on securing a portion
of the vulnerable loads. However, finding the locations and the
amount of the loads which must be secured requires solving
a non-convex pole placement optimization problem that is
computationally complex.
To address these shortcomings, in this work, we present an
analytical and low-complexity approach to assess the system’s
vulnerabilities and identify the victim nodes that correspond
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2to the “least-effort” DLAAs that will destabilize the system
or SLAAs that will cause unsafe frequency excursions. Here
“least effort” is in terms of the amount vulnerable load that
needs to be compromised at the victim buses to achieve the
aforementioned objectives. As in prior work on this topic
[13], [14], we use linear swing equations in our analysis. Our
approach is based on the theory of second-order dynamical
systems [15].
We make two important contributions. First, to analyze
DLAAs, we compute the system’s parametric eigenvalue
sensitivities. The sensitivity factors provide an insight into how
much the system’s eigenvalues change due to an incremental
change in the attack parameters. The sensitivities can then be
used to predict the attack impact on the system’s stability. A
major advantage of this approach is that the parametric sen-
sitivity factors need to be computed considering single-point
attacks only (i.e., considering DLAA at only one node of the
grid at a time). The effect of coordinated load altering attacks
at multiple buses can be calculated using the superposition
of multiple single-point attacks. Moreover, the computation
of the parametric sensitivity factors itself is computationally
cheap. Using the sensitivity approach, we propose a defense
strategy against DLAAs in which we compute the least-
amount of load that needs to be secured at each of the victim
nodes to ensure system stability. The defense problem requires
solving a simple linear programming problem, which is also
computationally cheap.
Second, to analyze SLAAs, we present a closed-form ex-
pression of the system’s dynamic response due to a sudden
change in the system load, in terms of its eigensolutions. Using
these expressions, we can compute the maximum fluctuation
in the system’s frequency response due to a unit change in
the load at a particular victim node, which helps us identify
the victim node corresponding to the least-effort SLAAs.
The closed-form expression also enables us to formulate the
defense against SLAAs as a linear programming problem, in
which we compute the least-amount of load that needs to
be secured at each of the victim nodes to ensure no unsafe
frequency excursions due to SLAAs.
Our results show that the eigenvalues obtained by the
parametric sensitivity approach can accurately predict the true
eigenvalues of the system under DLAAs over a wide range of
attacker’s parameters. Moreover, they also accurately charac-
terize the nodes corresponding to the least-effort DLAAs. Our
results also provide closed-form expressions to characterize
the minimum values of attack control parameters that will
destabilize the system (for DLAAs) and minimum change in
the system load that will cause unsafe frequency excursions
(for SLAAs) in terms of the system’s eigensolutions. Further,
the proposed defense can efficiently secure the system against
destabilizing DLAAs or SLAAs.
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to apply
results from the theory of second-order dynamical systems to
analyze load altering attacks against power grids. The theory
has been provably applied extensively in vibration problems
in civil, mechanical, and aerospace engineering [16]. While
eigenvalue sensitivities have been applied in the past in power
systems research for planning and analysis purposes (see e.g.,
[17], [18]), they have not been utilized in a power grid
security context. In particular, the application of parametric
sensitivity analysis of second-order systems to analyze DLAAs
and SLAAs is novel; this is one of the important contributions
of our work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present
the system model in Sec. II. We provide a brief overview
of the theory of second-order systems in Sec. III. Using this
theory, we analyze DLAAs and SLAAs in Sec. IV and Sec. V
respectively. We present the simulation results in Sec. VI and
conclude in Sec. VII.
Notations: We use bold font lower case and upper case to
denote vectors and matrices respectively. We denote the ith
entry of vector x by xi and the (i, j)th entry of a matrix X
by Xi,j . The real and imaginary parts of a complex number
X are denoted by Re(X) and Im(X) respectively. We use O
to denote a matrix of all zeros, 0
¯
to denote a vector of zeros,
and I to denote the identity matrix. We use [x;y] to denote
the concatenation of vectors x and y.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Power Grid Model: We consider a power grid consisting of
a set of N = {1, . . . , N} buses. The set of buses are divided
into generator buses G = {g1, . . . , gNG} and load buses L =
{l1, . . . , lNL}, where NG and NL represent the number of
generator and load buses respectively and N = G∪L. Here in,
gi and li represent the index of the ith generator and load bus
respectively. We let pL ∈ RNL denote the vector of demands
at the load buses L. The linearized version of the power grid
dynamic model is given by the differential equations [19]:I 0 00 −M 0
0 0 0
 δ˙ω˙
θ˙
 =
 00
pL
+
 0 I 0KI + BGG KP + DG BGL
BLG 0 BLL
δω
θ
 , (1)
where δ,ω ∈ RNG comprise the phase angles and ro-
tor frequency deviations at the generator buses respectively,
θ ∈ RNL comprise the phase angles of the load buses.
M,DG ∈ RNG×NG are diagonal matrices with their diagonal
entries given by the generator inertia and damping coefficients
respectively. KI ,KP ∈ RNG×NG are diagonal matrices with
their diagonal entries given by the integral and proportional
control coefficients of the generators respectively. Matrices
BGG ∈ RNG×NG ,BLL ∈ RNL×NL ,BGL ∈ RNG×NL are
sub-matrices of the admittance matrix, derived as Bbus =[
BGG BGL
BLG BLL
]
. We denote ωnom as the grid’s nominal fre-
quency, e.g., 50 Hz in Europe or 60 Hz in North America.
For safe operations, the frequency must be maintained within
the safety limits. We denote ωmax as the maximum permissible
frequency deviation for system safety. Thus, |ωnom − ωi| ≤
ωmax,∀i ∈ G. We note that in steady state, ωi = 0,∀i ∈ G.
Load Altering Attacks: Under IoT-based load-altering
attacks, the attacker manipulates the system load by syn-
chronously switching on or off a large number of high-wattage
3devices. Assume that the demand at the load buses consists of
two components pL = pLS + pLV , where pLS denotes the
secure part of the load (i.e., load that cannot be altered) and
pLV denotes the vulnerable part of the load. We denote the
set of victim nodes by V(⊆ L), and Nv = |V|, which are the
subset of load buses at which the attacker can manipulate the
load. The system load under load-altering attacks, which we
denote by pLa , is given by
pLa = p
LS + L −KLω. (2)
Herein, L is a step-change in the load introduced by the
attacker. Note Li = 0 if i /∈ V. The second component, KLω,
is a time-varying load altering attack that follows the frequency
fluctuations of the generator buses (note that this is a series
of load alterations whose magnitude is varying with time).
We assume that the attacker can monitor the frequency at a
subset of the generator nodes, which we denote by S(⊆ G),
by accessing the frequency measuring devices at these nodes.
The matrix KL ∈ RNL×NG denotes a matrix consisting of
attack controller gain values, where the elements KLi,j are the
gains corresponding to the attack at load bus i ∈ NL that
follows the frequency at generator bus j ∈ NG. Note that
KLi,j = 0, either if i /∈ V or j /∈ S. The total compromised
load must be less than the vulnerable portion of the demand,
i.e., L − KLω ≤ pLV . The power grid dynamics (1) with
the load altering attack in (2) becomes I O OO −M O
O O O
 δ˙ω˙
θ˙
 =
 00
pLs + 
L
+
 0 I 0KI + BGG KP + DG BGL
BLG −KL BLL
δω
θ
 . (3)
The last equations in (3) can be eliminated, and (3) can be
recast as[
δ˙
ω˙
]
=
[
0
M−1BM (pLs + 
L)
]
+
[
O I
M−1G M−1C
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
[
δ
ω
]
,
(4)
where G = −(KI +BGG−BMBLG), C = −(KP +DG+
BMKL), and BM = BGL(BLL)−1. For convenience, we
denote the matrix multiplying system state [δ;ω] in (4) by A.
For the system to be stable, the eigenvalues of the matrix A
must lie in the left-half of the complex plane.
Problem Formulation: Within the framework of (2), we
consider two types of load-altering attacks: (i) SLAAs, which
consist of an abrupt one-time increase/decrease in power
demand. In this case L 6= 0 and KL = O. As shown in
[11], if the value of L is large, this will result in unsafe
frequency excursions. (ii) DLAAs, in which KL 6= O. Under
DLAAs, the attacker can alter the eigenvalues of the system
indirectly by changing the elements of the matrix KL. Thus,
DLAAs can potentially destabilize the power grid frequency
control loop [13].
The objectives of this work are two-fold: (1) identify the
victim nodes that correspond to the least-effort SLAAs and
DLAAs, i.e., buses from which an unsafe excursion or desta-
bilizing attack can be launched by altering the least amount of
load, and (2) find a low-computational defense strategy that
computes the least amount of load to be secured at the victim
nodes such that the attacker cannot launch a successful SLAAs
or DLAAs. The results give us fundamental insights into
identifying vulnerable nodes in the grid that are susceptible
to DLAAs and SLAAs, and reinforce them to enhance the
grid’s resilience.
In the following section, we first provide a brief overview
of general second-order systems and describe results from
parametric sensitivities of its eigensolutions and dynamic
response. Then, in Sections IV and V, we apply these results
to analyze DLAAs and SLAAs respectively.
III. BRIEF REVIEW OF GENERAL SECOND-ORDER
SYSTEMS
Second-order matrix differential equations form the essen-
tial basis for the linear dynamic analysis of mechanical sys-
tems since their introduction by Lord Rayleigh [20] in 1877.
The standard second-order system is given by the following
dynamic equation:
Mu¨(t) + Cu˙(t) + Gu(t) = f(t). (5)
Here u(t) ∈ RNG and f(t) ∈ RNG are the response vector
and the forcing vector respectively. The system matrices in
equation (5), namely M, C and G ∈ RNG×NG , are the so-
called inertia, damping and stiffness matrices. In general they
are real and non-symmetric matrices.
A. Eigenvalues and Eigenvectors of Second-Order System
The eigenvalues and the eigenvectors are important descrip-
tors of the system and they together determine the system’s
dynamic response. The right eigenvalue problem associated
with the second-order system in(5) can be represented by the
λ−matrix problem as
λ2jMuj + λjCuj + Guj = 0¯
, ∀ j = 1, · · · , NG
where λj ∈ C is the j-th latent root (eigenvalue) and uj ∈
CN is the j-th right latent vector (right eigenvector). The left
eigenvalue problem can be represented by
λ2jv
T
j M + λjv
T
j C + v
T
j G = 0¯
T , ∀ j = 1, · · · , NG
where vj ∈ CN is the j-th left latent vector (left eigenvector)
and (•)T denotes the matrix transpose. When M,C and G are
general asymmetric matrices the right and left eigenvectors can
easily be obtained from the first-order formulations, for exam-
ple, the state-space method or Duncan forms [21]. Equation
(16) is transformed into the first-order (Duncan) form as
A z˙(t) +B z(t) = f(t) (6)
where A, B ∈ R2NG×2NG are the system matrices, f(t) ∈
R2N is the forcing vector and z(t) ∈ R2NG is the state vector
given by
A =
[
C M
M O
]
,B =
[
K O
O −M
]
(7)
f(t) =
{
f(t)
0
}
, z(t) =
{
u(t)
u˙(t)
}
. (8)
4Taking the Laplace transform of equation (6) we obtain
sAz¯(s) +Bz¯(s) = f¯(s) +Az0 (9)
Here, z¯(s) is the Laplace transform of z(t) and f¯(s) is the
Laplace transform of f(t) and the initial condition vector in
the state-space z(0) = z0. The vector p(s) = f¯(s)+Az0 is the
effective state-space forcing function in the Laplace domain.
The right and left eigenvalue problem associated with equa-
tion (6) can be expressed as
λjAzj +Bzj = 0¯ ,∀j = 1, · · · , 2NG,
λjyTj A+ yTj B = 0¯ ,∀j = 1, · · · , 2NG,
where λj ∈ C is the j-th eigenvalue and zj , yj ∈ C2NG is the
j-th right/left eigenvector which is related to the j-th right/left
eigenvector of the second-order system as zj = [uj ;λjuj ] and
yj = [vj ;λjvj ].
B. Dynamic Response of the Second-Order System
The eigenvalues along with the right and left eigenvectors
of the first-order system can be used to obtain the dynamic
response of the system in an efficient manner under general
forcing and initial conditions. The transfer function matrix
of the system in the Laplace domain can be expressed in
terms of the eigensolutions (see for example [22]) as H(s) =∑2NG
j=1
zjyTj
(s−λj) . Using this, the response vector can be obtained
from equation (9) as
z¯(s) = H(s)p(s) =
2NG∑
j=1
yTj p(s)
(s− λj)zj . (10)
This is the most general expression of the response vector as
a function of the total forcing function p(s) includes both the
initial conditions and applied forcing. We consider a special
case when the applied forcing function is a step function of the
form f(t) = U(t)f0, where f0 is a vector containing amplitudes
of the forcing at different degrees of freedom and U(•) is a
unit step function. Using this we obtain p(s) = 1s f0 +Az0.
Substituting this expression of p(s) in equation (10) and taking
the inverse Laplace transform of equation (10), we obtain
z(t) =
2NG∑
j=1
aj(t)zj , (11)
where aj(t) =
(
eλjt − 1
λj
)
yTj f0 + e
λjt
(
yTj Az0
)
. (12)
Equations (11) and (12) give the general closed-form expres-
sion of the response vector of non-symmetric second-order
dynamic systems in terms of the eigensolutions.
C. Parametric Sensitivity of the Eigensolutions
A key interest in this paper is to quantify the change in
the system characteristics and the response when elements of
the system matrices change. To include all possible changes
in the system matrices in a generic manner, we assume that
the system matrices M, C and G are functions of a parameter
vector α = {α1, α2, · · ·αm}T ∈ Rm. As a result, the mass,
damping and stiffness matrices become functions of α, that
is M ≡M(α),C ≡ C(α) and G ≡ G(α). We consider these
functions to be smooth, continuous and differentiable. There
are several publication which discuss the parametric sensitivity
of the eigensolutions of symmetric second-order systems (see
for example [15]). Below we follow the derivations in [23] for
non-symmetric second-order systems.
1) Sensitivity of Eigenvalues: We consider a generic ele-
ment in the parameter vector αm ∈ α. The sensitivity of
the eigenvalue of a second-order system with respect to the
parameter αm is given by [23]:
∂λj
∂αm
= −yTj
[
λj
∂A
∂αm
+
∂B
∂αm
]
zj . (13)
Note that the derivative of a given eigenvalue requires the
knowledge of only the corresponding eigenvalue and right
and left eigenvectors under consideration, and thus a complete
solution of the eigenproblem is not required.
2) Sensitivity of Eigenvectors: The sensitivity of the eigen-
vector of a second-order system with respect to the parameter
αm is given by [23]:
∂zj
∂αm
=
2NG∑
l=1
a
(α)
jl zl and
∂yj
∂αm
=
2NG∑
l=1
b
(α)
jl yl. (14)
Here a(α)jl and b
(α)
jl , ∀ l = 1, · · · , 2N are sets of complex
constants defined as
a
(α)
jl = −yTl
[
λj
∂A
∂αm
+
∂B
∂αm
]
zj , l = 1, · · · , 2NG; l 6= j,
b
(α)
jl = −yTj
[
λj
∂A
∂αm
+
∂B
∂αm
]
zl, l = 1, · · · , 2NG; l 6= j,
and a(α)jj = b
(α)
jj = −
1
2
vTj
[
2λj
∂M
∂αm
+
∂C
∂αm
]
uj .
3) Sensitivity of the Step-Response: Using the results
above, we derive the sensitivity of the step response with
respect to the change in the parameter αm. The result is
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The parametric sensitivity of the step response
with respect to α can be computed as
∂z(t)
∂αm
=
2NG∑
j=1
(
∂aj(t)
∂αm
zj + aj(t)
∂zj
∂αm
)
, (15)
where ∂aj(t)∂αm is a function of the eigenvalues and the eigen-
vectors and their derivatives.
The expression of ∂aj(t)∂αm and the derivation of Proposition 1
is presented the Appendix.
IV. ANALYSIS OF DYNAMIC LOAD ALTERING ATTACKS
BASED ON SECOND-ORDER SYSTEM THEORY
We now employ the results presented in Section III to
analyze DLAAs. Using some straightforward manipulations,
5the power grid dynamic equations in (4) can be converted
into the second-order system
Mδ¨ + Cδ˙ + Gδ = BM (pLs + 
L), (16)
where the matrices M,C and G are defined in Section II-B.
Let {λi}2NGi=1 denote the eigenvalues of the system without
DLAAs (i.e., with KL = O). Since the system is stable
without attacks, we must have Re(λi) < 0, i = 1, . . . , 2NG.
In DLAAs, the attacker can indirectly control the system
matrices by changing the elements of KL. Let us denote the
eigenvalues of the system with DLAAs by {νi(KL)}2NGi=1 .
The system will be rendered unstable if there exists at least
one νi(KL) such that Re(νi(KL)) > 0. Thus, in order to
understand the impact of DLAAs on system stability, we must
understand how the eigenvalues of the system change with
respect an incremental change in the elements of the matrix
KL.
Our approach is to treat the elements of KL as parameters of
the system matrices and use the parametric sensitivity results
to analyze DLAAs. For the power grid model in (16), using
(13), the parametric sensitivity of the eigenvalues with respect
to elements of KL can be computed as
∂λi
∂KLv,s
= −λiyTi
[
BMIv,s O
O O
]
zi, (17)
where Iv,s ∈ RNL×NG is a matrix whose (v, s)th entry is 1,
and all other entries are zero. Note that ∂λi
∂KLv,s
= 0 if v /∈ V
and s /∈ S. Using sensitivity analysis, the estimate ν̂i(KL) of
νi(K
L) can be computed as:
ν̂i(K
L) = λi +
∑
v∈V
∑
s∈S
∂λi
∂KLv,s
KLv,s, i = 1, . . . , 2NG. (18)
A. Least-Effort DLAAs Using Parametric Sensitivity
The node corresponding to the least-effort destabilizing
single-point DLAA can be located using sensitivity analysis
in the following manner. First note that if there exists at
least one νi(KL) > 0 the system becomes unstable. Also,
we assume that ν̂i(KL) closely approximates νi(KL). Then,
using (18) under single-point DLAA, it follows that a feedback
gain greater than −λi∂λi
∂KLv,s
renders the eigenvalue ν̂i(KL) to be
positive. We denote the minimum value of the feedback gain
at which the system becomes unstable by KL
∗
v,s and its estimate
by K̂L
∗
v,s. Since only one eigenvalue is required to be positive
for the system to be unstable, it follows that
K̂L
∗
v,s = min
i=1,...,2NG
−λi
∂λi
∂KLv,s
(19)
is the minimum value of feedback gain that makes the system
unstable. Using (19), the node that corresponds to the least-
effort destabilizing attack can be found as
{v∗, s∗} = argmin
v∈V,s∈S
K̂L
∗
v,s. (20)
A similar analysis can be performed for a coordinated multi-
point DLAA. In particular, the set of feedback gain values that
destabilize the system can be characterized as as follows. Let
kL ∈ RNvNs denote a vector whose elements are given by
KLv,s, v ∈ V, s ∈ S. If we define a polyhedron P as
P = {kL|λi +
∑
v∈V
∑
s∈S
∂λi
∂KLv,s
KLv,s < 0, i = 1, . . . , 2NG},
then all feedback gain vectors kL that lie outside P render the
system unstable.
Finally, note that the system dynamics under DLAAs can
also be evaluated by using results from the parametric sensi-
tivity of the step response presented in Proposition 1.
B. Defending Against DLAAs Based on Parametric Sensitivity
Results
Next, we illustrate the utility of the parametric sensitivity
approach to defend against DLAAs. We adopt a similar
approach to that of [13]. The main idea to find the minimum
amount of load that must be protected to ensure system
stability in the face of DLAAs. In practical terms, protecting
the load implies enhancing security measures such as enabling
encryption at a device level or in the communication links.
Minimizing the total amount of protected load will in turn
minimize the cost of deploying such security measures. The
defense problem can be formulated as a linear program (LP)
as follows:
min
PLPv ,K
L
v,s
∑
v∈V
PLPv (21)
s.t. 0 ≤ PLPv ≤ PLVv , ∀v ∈ V,
λri +
∑
v∈V
∑
s∈S
(
∂λi
∂KLv,s
)r
KLv,s < 0, ∀{λi}2NGi=1 ,∑
s
KLv,sω
max
s = (P
LV
v − PLPv )/2,∀v ∈ V,
where Xr represents Re(X). In (21), PLPv denotes the amount
of load (from the vulnerable portion of the load) that must
be protected at victim node v ∈ V. Naturally, this must be
less than the total vulnerable load (first constraint of (21)).
The second constraint of (21) ensures that the eigenvalues
are negative, and hence, the system cannot be made unstable
by the DLAA. The final constraint represents the limit on
the attack controller’s gain. It can be explained as follows.
First, note that KLv,sω
max
s is the maximum value of the
load to be altered by the attacker before the frequency at
sensor bus s exceeds the safety limit ωmaxs . This must be
less than the amount of vulnerable load after protection, i.e.,
PLVv −PLPv . Finally, the factor of 2 in the denominator of the
RHS represents the fact that the amount of load that can be
compromised must allow for both over and under frequency
fluctuations before the system frequency exceeds ωmaxs (see
[13]). In this constraint, we use equality to ensure that the
system remains stable even if the attacker uses the maximum
permissible value of the attack controller gain.
We note that although the main idea behind the defense
(i.e., protecting the vulnerable load) is similar to [13], a key
advantage of our approach is that it only requires solving
an LP rather than solving a non-convex pole placement op-
timization problem. LPs can be solved exactly and efficiently,
6demonstrating the effectiveness of the proposed approach of
analyzing DLAAs using the parametric sensitivity analysis of
the eigensolutions.
Computational Complexity: The main advantage of the
parametric sensitivity approach is the reduction in compu-
tational complexity. We note that the sensitivity parameters
only need to computed for single-point attacks only (i.e.,
one victim node at a time). This amounts to computing
NvNs sensitivity factors for each eigenvalue of the system.
Moreover, the computations (17) are cheap, since λi,yi and
zi need to only be computed once. Only the factor BMIv,s
must be recomputed for every combination of victim and
sensor nodes. For a coordinated multipoint attack, the net
effect of attacking multiple nodes can be computed using
the superposition principle as in (18). In contrast, directly
assessing the impact of DLAAs would require recomputing
the eigenvalues for each combination of victim/sensor nodes
(there are 2NvNs such combinations) and each value of the
feedback gain. This method soon becomes computationally
infeasible.
V. ANALYSIS OF STATIC LOAD ALTERING ATTACKS
In this section, we analyze SLAAs using results from the
theory of second-order systems. From (16), note that under
SLAAs, the attacker cannot modify the system matrices. As
such, it is not possible to change the eigenvalues of the system.
Thus the parametric sensitivity analysis of eigensolutions
cannot be used to assess the attack impact directly.
Although SLAAs cannot destabilize the system, a sudden
and abrupt change in the system load can result in unsafe
frequency excursions [11]. It is thus of interest to identify
nodes that correspond to the least-effort SLAAs (in terms of
the amount of altered load) and defend the system against
such attacks. To this end, we use the analytical expression for
the step response presented in (11) and (12). Without loss of
generality, we assume initial conditions z0 = 0. Thus, the step
response in the time domain is given by
z(t) =
2NG∑
j=1
eλjt − 1
λj
 (yTj f0)zj . (22)
In the above equation, note that z(t) = [δ(t);ω(t)]. Using
(22), we can express the power grid response to a change in
the system load L. First note from (16), the forcing function
f0 and the change in the load L are related as f0 = [BML;0].
Using this in (22), and rearranging, we obtain,
z(t) =
NL∑
i=1
Lli
2NG∑
j=1
(
eλjt − 1
λj
)
kjizj , (23)
where kj is a row vector given by kj = yTj B
M ∈ R1×NL and
kji is the ith element of kj . For convenience, let us denote
fi(t) =
2NG∑
j=1
(
eλjt − 1
λj
)
kjizj . (24)
Note that fi(t) = [fi,1(t), . . . , fi,2NG(t)]
T at each time t
is a 2NG dimensional vector, where each element of fi(t)
corresponds to the fluctuation of the components of z(t).
Equation (23) gives us a closed-form expression of the
system’s response in terms of the change in the load. A salient
observation is that the response is a linear function of the load
perturbation L. Assume we are interested in the fluctuation
of the frequency at the nth generator bus. Let us define
li∗,n = argmax
i=1,...,NL
fi,n(t
∗
i,n), n = NG + 1, . . . , 2NG, (25)
where t∗i,n = argmaxt fi,n(t). Since (23) is a linear function
of the system load, under a single-point SLAA, the node li∗n is
the node that corresponds to least-effort attack. In (25), t∗i,n can
be found by simply taking the derivative of fi,n(t) with respect
to time and finding the time at which the derivative function
is zero. Note that there may be multiple times at which the
derivative function becomes zero. For a stable system, we must
have Re(λi) < 0. Thus, each function fi,n(t) is a decaying
function of time (note the component eRe(λj)) in the numerator
of (23)). It thus follows that the peak fluctuation of fi,n(t)
occurs at time t at which the derivative function becomes zero
for the first time.
The function fi,n(t) represents the fluctuation of the nth
frequency component for a per unit change in the system load.
Thus, the minimum load change at load bus i under SLAA that
can cause an unsafe frequency excursion in the nth generator
bus frequency can be computed as
Lli,n =
ωmaxn
fi,n(t∗i,n)
, i = 1, . . . , NL. (26)
As in the case of DLAAs, the closed-form expression of the
step response in (23) can also be used to formulate the defense
optimization problem against SLAAs as follows:
min
∑
v∈V
PLPv (27)
s.t. 0 ≤ PLPv ≤ PLVv , ∀v ∈ V,∣∣∣ NL∑
i=1
Li
2NG∑
j=1
(
eλjt
∗
i,n − 1
λj
)
kjizjn
∣∣∣ ≤ ωmaxn
n = 1, . . . , 2NG,
Lv = P
LV
v − PLPv ,∀v ∈ V.
In (27), the objective function and the first constraint equation
is similar to (21). The second constraint represents the fact
that the peak of the system’s response due to the SLAA must
not exceed the safety limit. The last constraint ensures that
the compromised load does not exceed the vulnerable portion
of the load after protection. As in (21), we consider equality
constraint to ensure no unsafe frequency excursions even if
the attacker alters the maximum permissible load.
Once again, we note that optimization (27) is a linear
programming problem, which can be solved exactly and
efficiently. This again illustrates the merit of the proposed
technique. Finally, note that combined defense against DLAAs
and SLAAs can be solved in a straightforward manner by
combining the constraints of (27) and (21). We omit the details
due to the lack of space.
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Fig. 1: Left figure: Frequency dynamics under DLAAs for
the IEEE-6 bus system. The dotted horizontal lines represent
the ωmax = 2 Hz. Right figure: Values of KL
∗
v,s and K̂
L∗
v,s for
different victim buses.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present simulation results to illustrate
the effectiveness of the proposed approach. All simulations are
conducted using MATLAB and the power grid topological data
obtained from the MATPOWER simulator. We use IEEE-6, 14,
and 39 bus systems to illustrate our results. The power grid
dynamics are obtained by solving the differential equations (1)
in MATLAB.
Single-Point DLAAs: First we consider single-point
DLAAs using the 6-bus system. We set bus 1 as the sensing
bus, and inject DLAAs at buses 4,5, and 6. At victim bus
v ∈ V, we set the attack controller gain KL(v, 1) = 7, where
v = {4, 5, 6} and plot the frequency dynamics under DLAAs
in Fig. 1 (left figure). We only plot the dynamics of bus 1 as
this bus exhibits the maximum frequency fluctuation (among
the three generator nodes). We observe that the DLAA at bus 4
is able to destabilize the system, whereas the DLAA at buses
5 and 6 do not. Thus, bus 4 corresponds to the least effort
destabilizing attack. We also plot the values of KL
∗
v,s and K̂
L∗
v,s
(defined in (19)) for each of the victim nodes in Fig. 1 (right
figure). We observe that bus 4 has the least value of KL
∗
v,s,
and thus v∗ = 4. Moreover, the values of KL
∗
v,s and K̂
L∗
v,s
match closely. This result shows that the parametric sensitivity
approach can accurately predict the critical vulnerable nodes
of the system.
Further, we verify the accuracy of the sensitivity approach
in approximating the true eigenvalues of the system under
DLAAs. We plot the values of νi(KLv,s) and ν̂i(K
L
v,s) for
IEEE-6 bus and IEEE-39 bus systems by varying KLv,s in
Fig. 2. In each case, bus 1 is assumed to be the sensing bus. We
observe that the two quantities match closely, thus validating
the parametric sensitivity approach. We further also see that
the accuracy generally degrades for large values of attack
controller gains KLv,s, which is expected since the sensitivity
approach is a linear approximation. However, for a reasonable
range of KLv,s, the approximation remains accurate. E.g., in
Fig. 2 (bottom figure), we observe a good match for KLv,s,
values up to 50 p.u., which corresponds to pLv = 2K
L
v,sωmax =
2 × 50 × 2/50 = 4p.u. = 400 MWs of compromised load
(assuming base load of 100 MWs). We enlist the parameter
η = (KL
∗
v∗,s − K̂L
∗
v∗,s)/K
L∗
v∗,s for different IEEE bus systems
in Table I. We see that the sensitivity approach can closely
approximate the value of attack controller gain at which the
system becomes unstable.
Multi-Point DLAAs: Next, we investigate multi-point
DLAAs. We vary the attack controller gain values of two
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Fig. 2: Eigenvalues under single-point DLAAs for different
values of KLv,s. Top figure: IEEE-6 bus, Bottom figure: IEEE-
39 bus. Circles: νi(KLv,s)), Crosses: ν̂i(K
L
v,s).
Bus system η
IEEE 6-bus system 0
IEEE 14-bus system 0.009
IEEE 39-bus system 0.0385
TABLE I: Value of η =
∣∣(KL∗v∗,s− K̂L∗v∗,s)/KL∗v∗,s∣∣ for different
IEEE bus systems. Bus 1 is assumed to be sensor bus.
Fig. 3: Eigenvalues under multipoint DLAAs for different
values of KL4,1 and K
L
5,1 for IEEE-6 Bus system. Circles:
νi(K
L
v,s), Crosses:ν̂i(K
L
v,s).
victim nodes simultaneously in the IEEE-6 bus system, namely
buses 5 and 6. We plot the true eigenvalues of the system
νi(K
L
v,s) and those predicted by the parametric sensitivity
approach (ν̂i(KLv,s)). Once again, we observe a close match
between the two, showing that the proposed approach is
effective in approximating the true eigenvalues under multi-
point DLAAs.
We also implement the defense against DLAAs by solving
the optimization problem (21). We plot the amount of load to
be protected according to the solution of (21) for the IEEE-6
bus system in Fig. 4 (left figure). To verify its correctness,
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Fig. 4: Left figure: Protected load to defend against DLAAs.
Right figure: Dynamics under multi-point DLAAs with the
unprotected load. Both plots consider the IEEE 6-bus system.
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Fig. 5: Function fi,n(t) for different generator and load buses
considering IEEE-6 bus system.
we plot the frequency dynamics considering the maximum
permissible values of attack feedback again, i.e., by setting
KLv,s = (P
LV
v −PLP ∗v)/2ωmaxs , where (PLP ∗v is the solution
of (21)) in Fig. 4 (right figure). We observe that the oscillations
are damping and will eventually go to 0, thus verifying that
the proposed defense can make the system resilient to DLAAs.
Static Load Altering Attacks: We also perform simulations
for the results derived from SLAA in Section V. To this
end, we plot the functions fi,n(t) for different generator and
load buses considering IEEE-6 bus system in Fig. 5. These
functions represent the fluctuation of the frequency for per
unit change in the load. We observe that for Gen Bus 1 and 2,
the load bus corresponding to the least-effort SLAA is Bus 4,
where as for Gen 3, it is bus 6. Moreover, using (26), we can
also determine the minimum amount of load altering required
to cause unsafe frequency fluctuation. Using the curves above,
L4,1 = 0.48 p.u., 
L
4,2 = 0.63 p.u., and 
L
6,3 = 0.24 p.u.
(assuming ωmax = 2 Hz).
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we have shown how results from second-
order dynamical systems can be used to analyze IoT-based
load altering attacks against power grids. Our results offer a
low-complexity analytical approach to identify nodes corre-
sponding to the least-effort destabilizing DLAAs and least-
effort SLAAs that cause unsafe frequency excursions. Using
these results, we also proposed defense against DLAAs and
SLAAs. Our results show the analyses of DLAAs and SLAAs
depend critically on the eigensolutions of the system and their
sensitivity to changes in the attack parameters. Our analysis
provides insights into how a grid operator can enhance the
grids resilience to such attacks. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work to apply concepts for second-order
dynamical systems to analyze DLAAs and SLAAs. Future
work includes the extension of the results to a non-linear
dynamical system model of the power grid and analysis that
incorporates potential safety mechanisms such as UFLS.
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9APPENDIX: DERIVATIVE OF THE STEP RESPONSE
First, we provide the expressions for ∂aj(t)∂αm .The parametric
sensitivity of the step response with respect to αm can be
computed as
∂z(t)
∂αm
=
2N∑
j=1
(
∂aj(t)
∂αm
zj + aj(t)
∂zj
∂αm
)
, (28)
where ∂aj(t)∂αm
∂aj(t)
∂αm
=
∂a1j (t)
∂αm
+
∂a2j (t)
∂αm
U(t),
∂a1j (t)
∂αm
=
(
1 + [λj(t)− 1] eλj(t)
)
λ2j
∂λj
∂αm
(yTj f0)
+
eλj(t) − 1
λj
(
∂yj
∂αm
T
f0
)
and
∂a2j (t)
∂αm
= eλjt
(
yTj Az0
) ∂λj
∂αm
+eλjt
(
∂yj
∂αm
T
)
Az0 + eλjtyTj
∂A
∂αm
z0.
Proof. The parametric sensitivity of the step response can be
obtained by differentiating equation (11) with respect to αm.
The derivative can be expressed as
∂z(t)
∂αm
=
2N∑
j=1
∂aj(t)
∂αm
zj + aj(t)
∂zj
∂αm
, (29)
where The expression of ∂zj∂αm given in equation (14) need
to be used in the above equation. To obtain ∂aj(t)∂αm , note that
the expression of aj(t) in equation (11) can be conveniently
separated into two parts as
aj(t) = a1j (t)U(t− a) + a2j (t)U(t), (30)
where
a1j (t) =
eλj(t−a) − 1
λj
(yTj f0),
a2j (t) = e
λjt
(
yTj Az0
)
.
(31)
The first part is the forced response while the second part
in the transient repose arising due to the initial conditions.
For a stable system, the transient repose becomes negligibly
small after a finite time and can be ignored in the response
calculations. However, if the system become unstable due to
changes in the system parameters, then a2j (t) will have an
impact on the overall response. Differentiation of equation (30)
with respect to α results
∂aj(t)
∂αm
=
∂a1j (t)
∂αm
U(t− a) + ∂a2j (t)
∂αm
U(t). (32)
From equation (31) we obtain
∂a1j (t)
∂αm
=
(
1 + [λj(t− a)− 1] eλj(t−a)
)
s2j
∂λj
∂αm
(yTj f0)
+
eλj(t−a) − 1
λj
(
∂yj
∂αm
T
f0
)
. (33)
For the derivative of the transient response we have
∂a2j (t)
∂αm
= eλjt
(
yTj Az0
) ∂λj
∂αm
+ eλjt
(
∂yj
∂αm
T
)
Az0 + eλjtyTj
∂A
∂αm
z0. (34)
